Recent Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that proof relevant to showing a "custom" need not be a demonstration of a specific practice as a "custom," but the showing of a
long standing and still prevailing state enforced "custom" that
would encompass the particular kind of practice challenged would
be adequate.5 4 The Court held as being too restrictive any suggestion that the exclusive means available for demonstrating state enforcement of a "custom" would be by showing that the State used a
criminal statute for this purpose. "[A] state official might act to
give a custom the force of law in a variety of ways .... -55

In the

instant case, petitioner might be able to show that when the police
subjected her to false arrest for vagrancy, they were in fact enforcing a prevailing "custom" of racial segregation and the arrest
was only to harass and punish her for her association with Negroes.56 Or Miss Adickes might be able to show that the local
police encouraged the enforcement of a "custom" of segregating the
races in restaurants by intentionally tolerating violence or threats
of violence directed at those who violated the "custom."57 "[S] ettled practices of state officials may, by imposing sanctions or withholding benefits, transform private predilections into compulsory
rules of behavior no less than legislative pronouncements."58
RICHARD H. MCCLURE

SELECTIVE SERVICE-CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTORS-SECTION 6(j)

REQUIRES DEFERMENT FOR REGISTRANTS WHOSE BELIEFS EMANATE

FROM ETHICAL OR

MORAL BASES. Welsh v. United States (U.S.

1970)
Elliott Ashton Welsh II was convicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California of refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces in violation of the Military
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Selective Service Act of 1964.1 Welsh's chief defense was that he
was a conscientious objector and as such should have been deferred under § 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act of 1948.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with
but one judge dissenting. 3 That court, in purporting to apply the
test laid down by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Seeger,4 found that Welsh's convictions were not religious
in origin. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, reversed: Section 6(j) of the Selective Service Act requires
exemption for those who hold conscientious scruples against participation in war in any form, regardless of whether such scruples
arise from moral, ethical, or religious sources. Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
In 1940, Congress laid the basis for the present controversy
through its enactment of § 5 (g) of the Draft Act of that year,G
which exempted from service anyone whose opposition to war
could be traced to "religious training and belief." This considerably broadened the spectrum of persons who could qualify for conscientious objector exemption as the 1917 Draft Act 6 had limited
such exemption to membership in a well recognized "peace"
church. No definition of the phrase "religious training and belief" was included in the enactment, however. Both the courts and
the Selective Service System were immediately confronted with the
problem of what that phrase was intended to mean. Judge Augustus Hand speaking for the Second Circuit in United States V.
Kauten,7 said, regarding the controversial phrase, that:
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as
a means of relating the individual to his fellow man-and to his
universe-a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the
most highly civilized societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard eleto accept martyrdom in preference to
mentary self-interest and
8
transgressingits tenets.
Later in the same year this court reiterated its position emphasizing
that if a stricter rule were laid down, the effect would be a rever1. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462(a) (1964).
2. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 609. This was the provision for conscientious objectors which was in force at the time Welsh
applied for this deferment.
3. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
4. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
5. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885.
6. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76.
7. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
8. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
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sion to the requirements of the Act of 1917. 9 In United States
ex rel. Reel v. Badt the Second Circuit again reaffirmed its contention that one need not believe in a Supreme Being in order to
qualify as a conscientious objector under § 5 (g).10 As if in answer

to the Second Circuit's pronouncements, the Ninth Circuit in Berman v. United States, opined that one could not be a religious
conscientious objector within the meaning of the statute unless such
objections sprang from a sense of duty to a being higher than
man."
Congress than intervened and enacted the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1948, section 6(j) of which defined
"religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation."'12 To further clarify its position, Congress specifically indicated what "religious training and belief" was
not; "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code."' 13
The Supreme Court, then, in United States v. Seeger'4 interpreted
the "Supreme Being" clause of the 1948 Act in such a way as to
render it religiously neutral thus avoiding the constitutional question of whether an exemption for traditional religious objectors
only violated the first amendment establishment clause. The test
which the Court formulated was: "A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition."' 5
In response to this judicial pronouncement, Congress amended
its 1964 enactment of the Selective Service Act, which was identical
in its provision for conscientious objectors with the Act of 1948,
to read:
9. United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 524 (2d Cir.
1943).
10. 141 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1944).
11. 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946).

12. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 609. Compare the
language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605, 633-34 (1931), which was quoted with approval by the Berman court:
"The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation."
13. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 609.
14. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
15. Id. at 176.

Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who by reason of religious training and
belief is conscientiously opposed to participating in war in any
form.16

The Government, in prosecuting Welsh, attempted to show
that his convictions were not religious in origin by pointing out the
fact that Welsh himself had denied that they were. In fact, he had
stated that his beliefs had been formed "by reading in the fields of
history and sociology,"' 17 thus jeopardizing his position further by

using language similar to that used by Congress in framing its
exception to the exemption empodied in § 6 (j). The Court, however, noted that very few registrants for the draft realized the
legal implications of the word "religious" as used in the statute.
Thus, a registrant's statement that his views are not religiously motivated should not be taken at face value. The Court then found
that Welsh's beliefs were religious under the Seeger decision even
though he disclaimed them because they were "certainly religious
8
in the ethical sense of that word."'
The Government further attempted to distinguish Welsh's views
from those of Seeger by positing that Welsh's ideas were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical or a merely personal
moral code."' 19 The Court answered this contention by finding
that Congress did not intend to deny conscientious objector status to
those who otherwise met the stipulations for such status merely
because they held strong convictions concerning the nation's
domestic or foreign affairs. Nor did Congress intend, this Court
went on to say, to deny deferment under § 6(j) to one whose views
were substantially influenced by considerations of public policy,
provided, of course, that such a person otherwise met the statutory
20

qualifications.

In deciding the Seeger case by interpreting legislation, rather
than on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court reached a result
which Congress clearly did not intend. Congress was obviously
aware of the inter-circuit conflict which the 1940 conscientious objector section 21 had engendered. The Senate Committee report on
the proposed legislation quoted from Chief Justice Hughes dissenting opinion in United States v. Macintosh22 which was also
16. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j)
amended (Supp. I1, 1968).

17. 398 U.S. at 341.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 342-43.
See note 6, supra.
283 U.S. 605 (1931).

(1964) as
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quoted by the Ninth Circuit in Berman v. United States.23 In addition, the report cited Berman as a reference and completely
omitted any reference to Kauten or any of the subsequent decisions
of the Second Circuit.24 The majority in Seeger, however, easily

cleared this hurdle by determining that the citation to Berman in
the Senate report was indicative only of what Congress believed "religious belief" was not.25 This view completely overlooked the fact
that Congress, in § 6 (j) of the 1948 Act, defined "religious training
and belief" in
terms of a Supreme Being as had the Ninth Circuit
26
in Berman.
The Welsh Court has gone one step farther and has completely
eliminated the religious requirement by interpreting it so as to
render it meaningless. Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
stated that even those persons whose objections to war are founded
to a large extent on considerations of public policy should be accorded conscientious objector status. Further, the only two groups
of persons whom Mr. Justice Black listed as obviously falling outside the purview of the exemption were those whose beliefs were
not deeply held, and those whose convictions were merely the product of feelings based on policy, pragmatism, or expediency. 27 The
obvious thrust of this pronouncement is to grant exemption to
those who hold their convictions with the requisite strength even if
their convictions spring from a "merely personal moral code." Thus,
all that is now required to gain conscientious objector status under Welsh is that a person hold his personal moral code in the
same esteem as the theistic objector holds the mandates of his
28

God.

Not only is the tack taken by the Court in this case internally
inconsistent, it is also illegal. In construing § 6 (j) so as to reflect
its own will and not that of Congress, the Court has violated its

own rules for interpreting legislation. In Rosado v. Wyman, decided but two months before Welsh, the Court specifically stated
23. 156 F.2d 377, 380.
24. 2 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2002 (1948), 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 2002, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
25. "Thus we think that rather than citing Berman for what it said
'religious belief' was, Congress cited it for what it said 'religious belief'
was not." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 178.
26. 156 F.2d at 380.
27. 398 U.S. at 342-43.
28. Id.

that the limits of its power to stretch elastic statutory language
are fixed by the context of its usage and its legislative history. 20
If indeed, the language contained in § 6(j) was intended to be
elastic, it nevertheless seems as if the Court has violated its mandate in both respects. Further, in Yu Cong. Eng v. Trinidad, the
court conceived of its duty
in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law.
But it is very clear that amendment may not be substituted for
construction, and that a court may not exercise legislative functions
to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.8 0
In Welsh, the Court, in effect, amended § 6 (j) so as to allow ethical or moral beliefs to be grounds for exemption as well as religious

ones.3 1 In so doing, the Court exercised a purely legislative function in order to save § 6 (j) from a constitutional collision with the
establishment clause of the first amendment.
The only alternative basis for reaching the same result is to face
the constitutional issue as Mr. Justice Harlan advocates in his
concurring opinion. The test to be applied, he suggests, in deter-

mining whether or not an enactment violates the first amendment
is to ask what the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment
are.
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.32

Arguably, the primary effect and possibly the purpose of the legislation under consideration was to grant a privilege to religious conscientous objectors not enjoyed by non-religious, a discrimination
which the Court condemned in Torcaso v. Watkins,3 3 and in Everson v. Board of Education.3 4 In Torcaso, which involved the rights
of a non-believer, the Court observed that "[n] either [the State nor
the Federal Government] can constitutionally pass laws or impose
29. 397 U.S. 397 (April 6, 1970).
30. 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926).

31. "That section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would
give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of
an instrument of war." 398 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
32. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963).
33. 367 U.S. 488 (1960).
34. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers
"35

To refute this argument, the Welsh dissent puts forth two possible explanations for Congress' action in granting deferment to
religious conscientious objectors only, which the dissenters believe
would render the legislation free from constitutional defects. The
first of these is that Congress may have exempted these objectors
out of purely practical considerations; due to the fact that they
would be of no more use in combat than many others unqualified
for military service. 36 Such explanation may obviate any objection to the effect that Congress intended to unconstitutionally discriminate between believers and non-believers. However, it is not
responsive to the objection that the primary effect of such legislation was to invalidly create such discrimination. The second possible explanation put forth was that Congress may have granted
this exemption because in its view withholding the exemption
would possibly violate the free exercise clause.3 7 Again, this
explanation may correctly answer the question of purpose, but it
is far from satisfactory in solving the primary effect problem. The
foregoing analysis, then, leads to the conclusion that
in the draft act, Congress unconstitutionally discriminated against
atheists, agnostics, and men . . .who, whether they be religious
or not, are motivated in their objection to the draft by profound
moral
beliefs which constitute the central convictions of their being.38
In a case like Welsh, where a statute is defective constitutionally because of underinclusion, the Court, in order to remedy the
situation, may either eliminate the benefit with regard to the class
currently receiving it or may extend this benefit to the class excluded.3 9 As it would be highly impractical for the Selective
Service System to revoke the exemptions currently enjoyed by religious conscientious objectors, and in view of the fact that such
a course of action, as the Welsh dissent indicates, may be violative
of those objectors; first amendment right to the free exercise of
35. 367 U.S. at 495.
36. 398 U.S. at 367.
37. Id. at 369-70.
38. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 911 (D. Mass. 1969), discussed at 7 SAN DimO L. REv. 100 (1970).
39. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Iowa Des Moines
Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).

religion, the best course of action would be to extend the benefit of
exemption to non-religious objectors like Welsh.
The only major obstacle to deciding the case on constitutional
grounds is the question of whether Welsh has the standing to raise
such an objection. In United States v. Raines the Court ruled that
"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional.1 40 The Welsh dissent espouses the view that even if the section is unconstitutional
by virtue of creating an establishment of religion in contravention
to the first amendment, Welsh cannot complain as he is not affected
thereby. 4 1 However, if Welsh is denied the equal protection of the
law in violation of the fourteenth amendment, he is indubitably directly affected. As the Court stated in Iowa Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, "[t]he right invoked is that to equal treatment .... ,,42 Similarly in Skinner v. Oklahoma43 the Court held
that the defendant's right to equal protection had been abridged by
a state statute under which he was sentenced to be sterilized as a
habitual thief while those who engaged in embezzlement were not
subject to such extreme punishment. Welsh is analogous to Skinner
in that here, Welsh would be subject to induction into the armed
forces for merely asserting his constitutional right to non-belief.
In view of the foregoing, it would appear that if the case were
decided on constitutional grounds, Welsh should have the right to
bring forth such a challenge.
Regardless of the basis of decision, Welsh is the latest pronouncement as to what qualifications a registrant must possess in order to
be granted exemption as a conscientious objector. The immediate
effect of this ruling will probably appear within the Selective Service System. For good or ill, Welsh finally clears up the confusion
which the Seeger decision created as to what "religious training
and belief" is. In addition, Welsh will inevitably streamline the
investigatory procedure required of the local boards in determining
who is to receive conscientious objector exemption. This result
will obtain because Welsh all but eliminates the need for inquiry
into the source of an applicant's convictions. Under the Welsh decision, all that a local board need find in order to grant exemption
40. 362 U.S. 17 (1960) quoting from United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S.
396 (1930).
41. 398 U.S. at 368-69.
42. 284 U.S. at 247.
43. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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is that the applicant's beliefs issue in some way from feelings of
conscience, without regard to whether this conscience is guided by
ethical, moral, or religious predispositions, and that they be held
with the requisite strength.
Of course, the decision will also have the effect of making the
conscientious objector exemption easier to obtain which will undoubtedly prompt many more registrants, especially college students, to apply for it. Thus, the local boards will probably have to
devote just as much time to administering the deferment as before Welsh due to the fact that time saved in verifying an individual applicant's right to exemption will be more than offset by
the increased volume of applications.
In the event the Selective Service System finds itself deluged
with such applications, a not too unlikely eventuality, Congress
may decide to abolish the classification altogether. This would
bring the issue of whether the free exercise clause of the first
amendment requires an exemption for religious objectors squarely
before the Court. Previous pronouncements on the subject have
all been to the effect that Congress need not exempt anyone. However, these cases have invariably stated their belief as dictum
MICHA
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J. MCCAB.

44. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).

